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Abstract 
South Sudan’s independence has raised the number of Nile riparian states to 
eleven, and the questions of state succession and international law discourse on the 
issue are expected to arise in relation to South Sudan. Some of the international 
legal issues that may be raised in relation to Nile agreements are: whether the new 
state of South Sudan (in its utilization of the Nile waters) is under an international 
legal obligation to respect and honor the 1929 and 1959 Nile agreements made by 
Sudan with Egypt. The article addresses this issue in light of the law of state 
succession to treaties. Based on several theories of international law relating to 
state succession with respect to treaties, I argue that South Sudan is not bound by 
the 1929 and 1959 Nile waters agreements. More specifically, it is argued that the 
1929 and 1959 agreements between Egypt and Sudan governing trans-boundary 
water resources do not fall within the boundary exceptional clause, and South 
Sudan can nullify the agreements at any time.  
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Introduction 
The people of South Sudan have struggled for more than five decades against all 
post independence governments in Sudan.1 More importantly, in 2005, a 
comprehensive peace agreement2 was signed that gave the right to secession of 
                                           
 Abiy Chelkeba Worku, LL.B (MU), M.A (MU), LL.M (AAU). Lecturer of Law, 
Postgraduate Programs Coordinator, School of Law, Mekele University. This article has 
used part of the author’s concept note titled  “Succession of Southern Sudan to the 1929 
and 1959 Nile Water Agreements and its Implication” that was written in March 2011. 
1 Samuel Assefa (2009), Post Referendum Prospects and Challenges the case of Southern 
Sudan, a paper presented on a panel discussion organized by inter-African Group, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, 2009, p.8.  
2  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan did not 
include an agreement on South Sudan’s rights to the Nile after independence even though 
both parties rely on the Nile as their principal water source.  At the time or writing this 
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South Sudan by referendum, which was conducted on January 2011.3 This led to 
the birth of the youngest African state.4 As South Sudan seceded from Sudan, it 
has become the 11th riparian state5 of the Nile Basin.6 It is located downstream 
of the Nile Equatorial Lakes region and has strong connections to the Eastern 
Nile.7 With the emergence of South Sudan, international law issues8 are bound 
to arise9 and the question of state succession is expected to ensue. The author 
believes that greater attention will be paid to the impact of the birth of South 
Sudan that will have a potential impact on the Nile legal regime. 10   
The scope of the article does not allow detailed analysis of issues on state 
succession situations, including the political factor which could lead the 
different states to different political decisions regarding the Nile water 
agreement. It is sufficient for our purposes to limit the scope of the study to the 
legal state succession scenarios of South Sudan to the 1929 and 1959 Nile water 
Agreements. It is to be noted that the issue of state succession and the political 
development of South Sudan are very dynamic and it is often influenced by non-
legal issues. As result, this article cannot claim to be exhaustive. 
Various studies have been made on state succession and majority of them 
focus on impact of succession in the former Soviet bloc, impact of 
decolonization in the new states of Africa after decolonization and its impact on 
territorial obligation, debt liabilities, state responsibility and the like. However, 
                                                                                                            
article , South Sudan has neither signed nor entered into any agreement, whether pre-or 
post- independence, concerning its use of Nile.     
3 See, South Sudan’s Flag Raised at Independence Ceremony, BBC  NEWS (July, 2011), 
<http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world.africa.14092375>   
4  Ibid.  
5  Riparian means “ of, relating to, or located on the banks of a river or a stream.” Blacks 
Law Dictionary 1141 (9th ed. 2009). A Riparian right is “the right of a landowner whose 
property borders on a body of watercourse”. Id., at 1441. 
6  The Nile riparian states are; Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Eritrea, available at 
http://www.nilebasin.org/  (Accessed 23/12/2015).  
7 International Crisis Group (2006), Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement; the Long 
Road Ahead, Africa Report, No 106, Nairobi, Kenya, 2006(a), p.10. 
8 It shall be noted that South Sudan has entered international life at a time of uncertainty for 
the Nile. The agreement and utilization of the Nile River is a fragmented legal regime 
without an all-inclusive arrangement.  
9 Brenthurst Foundation (2010), Everything at Zero, Beyond the Referendum – Drivers and 
Choices for Development in Southern Sudan, E Oppenheimer & Son  Publishing Ltd, 
Marshalltown, South Africa, 2010, PP.18 Online, Available HTTP,  
  <www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org,> (Accessed: 31/10/2010). 
10 As the fledging new nation looks to the Nile as an indispensable natural resource in its 
quest to achieve sustainable development, it will inevitably needs to consult with all its 
co-riparian on waterworks that it plans to construct on the water course.  
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the studies have rarely focused on the impact of succession on trans-boundary 
water obligations, and more specifically in relation to the birth of South Sudan. 
For example, a study carried out on state succession to territorial obligations in 
the case of South Sudan has examined the theories of state succession and it 
reached at a conclusion that South Sudan is under an international obligation to 
honour the Nile Water agreements signed between Sudan and Egypt.11 However, 
the study rushes into a conclusion. Moreover, research made on recent changes 
on the Nile water and its Implication on South Sudan fails to take into account 
the recent development and current position of South Sudan.12  In-depth study 
and different scenarios have not yet been conducted especially with regard to its 
implication on the current fragmented legal regime governing the Nile River and 
its implication to Ethiopia.   
The issues in relation to Nile agreements include (a) whether South Sudan is 
under international legal obligations to respect and honour the 1929 and 1959 
Nile agreements made by Sudan with Egypt;13 (b) the conditions that may 
obligate South Sudan to fulfil its presumed international law obligation under 
the 1929 and 1959 Nile agreements; (c) the conditions that may relieve South 
Sudan from honouring its presumed obligation.; and (d) the laws or conventions 
of international law governing state succession that apply to a new successor 
state and more specifically to South Sudan.  
The first section highlights the background of the study. Section 2 surveys 
the legal regime and the institutional framework that govern the utilization of 
the Nile river with particular emphasis to the 1929 and 1959 Agreements that 
were concluded between Sudan and Egypt.  The third section focuses on the law 
of state succession specifically in light of the 1978 Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.14 Sections 4 and 5 deal with the 
succession to international trans-boundary waters agreements and succession of 
South Sudan to the 1929 and 1959 Nile Agreements respectively. Sections 6 and 
                                           
11 Mohammed Helal (2013),  “Inheriting International rivers; State Succession to Territorial 
Obligations, South Sudan and the 1959 Nile Water Agreements”, Emory International 
Law Review, 2013, p. 947. 
12 Nadia Sanchez  and Yoyeeta Gupta(2011), “Recent Changes in the  Nile Region may 
Create an Opportunity for a more equitable Sharing of the Nile River Water”, Netherlands 
International Law Review: 363-385, 2011, p. 374.    
13 Prior to the independence of South Sudan, a number of International treaties and Basin-
wide cooperative arrangements regulated the use of the Nile waters by South Sudan. The 
most prominent of those is the Nile water Agreements concluded between Egypt and 
Sudan in 1929 and 1959. See Generally, R. O. Collins (1994), History, Hydro politics and 
the Nile: Nile Control: Myth or Reality? (in P. P. Howell and J.A Allan eds., 1994, The 
Nile. Sharing a Scarce Resource, 109, 110.   
14 This part examines the 1978 Vienna Convention on States Succession in respect of 
Treaties, which is the principal international instrument.  
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7 respectively analyse the implication of South Sudan’s secession on 1929 and 
1959 Agreements and future potential implications to Ethiopia.  
1. Brief Remarks on State Succession 
State succession refers to the actual substitution of a state by another with regard 
to sovereignty over a given jurisdiction in accordance with international law.15 It 
consists of any change of sovereignty over a given territory whose effect is 
recognized in international law. State succession includes both “succession in 
fact” and “succession in law”.16 Succession in fact refers to the “factual situation 
in which, through some political evolution, a territory that previously was 
placed under the sovereignty of one state comes to fall under that of another 
state i.e. to the transfer of territory from one state to another”.17 Succession in 
law refers to the “succession of the new sovereign to legal rights and obligations 
of the old sovereign, or more generally, to pre-existing legal situations”.18 We 
are here concerned with the succession of the obligations of the previous 
sovereign to its territorial successor. 
Whenever there is a change of sovereignty in a given territory of a state (for  
example, when a part or parts of a given territory of a state separate from its 
parent state and become new independent state), many international legal issues 
relating to state succession arise.19 Some of the contemporary international legal 
issues that may arise with respect to state succession are related to the Nile 
agreements between Sudan and Egypt vis-à-vis the new state of South Sudan. 20  
The absence of accord governing South Sudan's utilization of the Nile 
increases different layers of multifaceted problems regarding the legal and 
institutional administration of the Nile basin.21 Nile is the largest river basin in 
the world without comprehensive agreement binding all riparian parties.22  
                                           
15 Tim Hiller (1998), Source Book on Public International Law, 2rd ed., Demon Ford 




19 See Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 
1978 (Herein after cited as 1978 Vienna Convention and Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 1983 (hereinafter 
cited as the 1983 Vienna Convention).   
20  Charles L. Katz (2013), “Another Cup at the Niles Crowded Spigot: South Sudan and its 
Nile Water Rights”; Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 44 1249-1279, p. 
1252. 
21  Ibid. 
22 Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen (2010), “The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement 
Negotiations and the Adoption of a ‘Water Security Paradigm’ Flight into Obscurity or a 
logical Cul-De-Sac?”, 21 Eur. J. Int’t L. 412, 440 (2010) . 
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Sudan and Egypt remain bound by the terms of the controversial 1929 and 1959 
agreements for the full utilization of the Nile waters dividing the Nile between 
the two parties.  It is under this setting that a newly independent South Sudan 
has yet to articulate its intentions which involve the international law issues23  
highlighted in the following sections.  
2. The Nile Water Agreements 
The treaties and legal instruments regulating the use of Nile waters may be 
divided into three categories.24 These are:- 
(i) Treaties between the United Kingdom and the powers in control of the 
upper reaches of the Nile basin around the beginning of the 20th 
Century;25 
                                           
23  Agreement for the full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Sudan-Egypt, Nov.8, 1959, 453 
U.N.T.S 51, available at:  
    http:// internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/uar_sudan.html (herein after 
cited as 1959 Nile Water Agreement).    
24 Arthur Okoth-Owiro (2004), State Succession and International Treaty Commitments: A 
Case Study of the Nile Water Treaties, Published by  Konrad Adenauer Foundation and 
Law and Policy Research Foundation, Nairobi, Kenya, 2004,PP.21, Available at: 
   < http://www.kas.de > (Accessed: 31/12/2014)  
25 The first of these agreements was concluded between Great Britain and Italy on April 15, 
1891.  See Carol Christina Carroll, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River 
Baisn, 12 GEU, INT’N  ENVTL.L. REV 276 (1999). This agreement was followed by a 
series of agreements between the United Kingdom and the upper Nile riparians. See 
Protocol Between the Governments of Great Britain and Italy for the Demarcation of their 
Respective Spheres of Influence in Eastern Africa, Apr. 15, 1891, 2 CONSOL. T.S. 434; 
see also Office of Legal Affairs, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the 
Utilization of International Rivers for other Purposes than Navigation, at 127, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/12, U.N. Sales No. 63.V.4 (1963) at 115-27. The first of these 
agreements was signed with Ethiopia in Addis Ababa on May 15, 1902 (Ibid). Next, 
Great Britain concluded an agreement on May 9, 1906, with the Government of the 
Independent State of the Congo which undertook not to construct any waterworks on the 
Semiliki or Isango Rivers that would diminish the flow of water into Lake Albert. 
Agreement Between Great Britain and the Independent State of the Congo, Modifying the 
Agreement Signed at Brussels, 12th May, 1894, Gr. Brit.–Congo., May 9, 1906, 4 Consol. 
T.S. 2920. The treaty is also reproduced in Office of Legal Affairs, cited above in this 
note, at 99. Also in 1906, Great Britain, France, and Italy issued a tripartite declaration in 
which the three Powers pledged to protect “[t]he interests of Great Britain and Egypt in 
the Nile Basin, more especially as regards the regulation of the waters of that river and its 
tributaries.” C.O. Okidi, Review of Treaties on Consumptive Utilization of Waters of Lake 
Victoria and Nile Drainage System, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161, 169 (1982). Then, 
during the period of June–December 1925, Italy, acting on behalf of Eritrea, and Great 
Britain, acting on behalf of the Sudan, exchanged notes to determine the amount of water 
that would be diverted from the River Gash for irrigation purposes in Eritrea. see also 
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(ii) The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement; 
(iii) Post-colonial treaties and other legal instruments (The 1959 Nile Waters 
Agreement). 
The 1929 agreement was signed between Egypt and Great Britain on behalf of 
Sudan and other British colonies26 in the basin (Uganda, Kenya, and 
Tanzania).27 The 1929 Treaty did not allow upper riparians to alter the Niles 
flow without obtaining consent first from the U.K.28 The agreement is 
“essentially directed towards the regulation of irrigation arrangements on the 
Nile basin.”29 The Agreement included specific volumetric water allocations – 
48 billion m3 (Bm3)/year (yr) to Egypt and 4 Bm3/yr to Sudan – and helped to 
institutionalize the belief that Egypt and Sudan had ‘natural and historic rights’ 
to the Nile water.30 The 1929 agreement grants representatives of the Egyptian 
Irrigation Service in Sudan the liberty to cooperate with the Resident Engineer 
at Sennar Dam to monitor discharges.31 The parties agreed that with the 
exception of prior consent of the Egyptian Government:  
no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on 
the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows, as far as 
all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which 
would, in such manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, 
either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its 
arrival, or lower its level.”32   
The second Nile Water Agreement commonly called the 1959 Agreement is 
aimed at the full Utilization of the Nile Waters.33 After the Independence of 
                                                                                                            
Office of Legal Affairs, cited above in this note,, at 127, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12,   
U.N. Sales No. 63.V.4 (1963) at 128 31.   
26  The 1929 Treaty is remarkably one-sided, demonstrating, the British desire to appease 
Egypt in order to secure the shortest sea-route to British-controlled India via the Suez and 
Red Sea ports. See Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World 69 (1999). 
27 David. S (2010), Nile Basin Relations: Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, George Washington 
University Press, Washington DC, USA, 2010, p.6, Available at: 
   <http://www.mailto:elliott.org,> (Accessed: 03/04/2015)  
28 Joseph W. Dellapenna (1994), Treaties as Instruments for managing Internationally-
shared water resource: restricted sovereignty v. community of property, 26 CASE 
W.RES. J. INT’L. L. 27, 48 (1994).   
29 Jacob Granit (2010) , the Nile Basin and the Southern Sudan Referendum,  Regional 
Water Intelligence Publishing enterprise, Stockholm, Sweden,  December, 2010, p. 41. 
30 Ibid. 
31 David. S, supra note 27, p. 6. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ana Elisa Cascão (2009), Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: 
Unilateralism vs. Cooperation?, King’s College of London Press, United Kingdom, 2009, 
p. 2, Available at: <http://www.water‐alternatives.org>. (Accessed: 10/11/2014).  
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Sudan in 1956, Egypt’s plans to build the High Aswan Dam and the need to 
renegotiate existing water allocations34 under the 1959 Agreement prompted the 
two countries to come up with new volumetric water allocations – 55.5 Bm3/yr 
to Egypt and 18.5 Bm3/yr to Sudan under a new agreement.35 The two parties 
agreed that Egypt constructs the Sudd-el-Aali and Sudan shall construct “the 
Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile and any other works which the Republic of 
Sudan considers essential for the utilization of its share, and including projects 
for the increase of the River yield.”36  
The agreement between Egypt and Sudan further provides that the two 
parties agree on a unified view ahead of any negotiations with any other Nile 
riparian States and concerning Nile waters, if such negotiations result in an 
agreement to construct works on the river outside Egyptian and Sudanese 
territory.37 Egypt and Sudan also agreed to adopt a unified view in case other 
riparian States claim a share in the Nile waters; and if such claim results in the 
allocation of water to another Nile riparian State,38 the allocated amount would 
be deducted in equal parts from the shares of Egypt and Sudan.39 The 1959 
Agreement also calls for the establishment of a Technical Commission for 
knowledge sharing purposes, and, in the event of a decrease in the Niles yield, 
this Technical Commission is entitled to determine the new water allotments. 40 
The 1959 Agreement lacks a severability clause – a treaty clause which states 
that the breach or the voiding of one part of the agreement does not result in the 
voiding of the entire agreement, thereby rendering renegotiation particularly 
difficult.41  Most relevant to the case of South Sudan is the complete absence in 
the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement of any provision relating to state succession, 
generally referred to as a “devolution provision.” 42  
A reference to the 1929 Agreement is made in the preamble of the 1959 
Agreement between Sudan and Egypt, and this has been interpreted by some as 
                                           
34  The official reason as stated in the preamble to the 1959 Nile Water Agreement itself was 
that “the Nile Waters Agreement concluded in 1929 provided only for the partial use of 
the Nile Waters and did not extend to include a complete control of the Rivers waters.” 
See 1959 Nile Water Agreement.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Jacob Granit, supra note 29, p.26. 
38 The 1959 Nile Water Agreement specifies the method of accession to the treaty. Article 7 
declares that “this Agreement shall come into force after its sanction by the two 
contracting parties, provided that either party shall notify the other party of the date of its 
sanction, through the diplomatic channels.”  
39 See 1959 Nile Water Agreement Art. 2(4).  
40 See 1959 Nile Water Agreement Art. 4(1)e.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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evidence that Sudan has in fact not renounced to the continued binding effect of 
the 1929 Agreement.43 As a result, the 1959 Agreement is not per se rejection 
and replacement of the 1929 treaty,44 although Sudan could have attempted to 
annul the 1929 treaty through rebus sic stantibus.45  
The 1959 Agreement has reinforced down-streamer claims of ‘natural and 
historic rights’ to the Nile waters, and became the 'redline' demarcated by Sudan 
and Egypt for future negotiations in the basin.46 The upstream riparian states 
were not included in the Agreement, and have continuously criticized its 
bilateral nature.47 The 1959 Agreement represents the backbone of the hydro 
political dilemma in the Nile basin. Downstream riparian states want to maintain 
it while upstream riparian states want to replace it with a multilateral agreement 
based on equitable sharing.48 
3. State Succession under International Law in Respect to 
Treaties  
State Succession usually attracts remarks to the effect that it is ‘undeveloped’, 
‘confused’, ‘lacking in precision’. It is apparent that State succession is an issue 
that arises at transitional moments in international relations under distinctive 
circumstances. In the last century, for example, there were several discrete eras 
in which state succession became an issue: the post-war reconstruction of 1918 
and 1945, the period of decolonization during the late 1950s up to late 1960s 
                                           
43  Arthur Okoth-Owiro , supra note 24 , p.20. 
44  See 1959 Nile Water Agreements, Yimer Fisseha, State Succession and the Legal Status 
of International Rivers, in The Legal Regime of International Rivers and Laws 177,187 
(in Ralph Zacklin and Lucius Caflisch eds., 1981). Though the 1959 Agreement 
effectually replaced 1929 Treaty, provisions in the 1959 Treaty that are not replaced 
explicitly repudiated remain valid. See Christina M. Carroll, “Past and Future Legal 
Framework of the Nile River Basin”, 12 Geo. INT’T ENVTL.L.REW.269, 280 (1999).   
45  Rebus sic stantibus is Latin for “matters still standing.” This principle of international law 
holds that all agreements are only binding as long as there are no fundamentally changed 
circumstances. Blacks Law Dictionary, 1381 (9th Ed. 2009). Sudan’s rebus sic stantibus 
claim is the change in status from colony to independent nation. Yimer Fisseha, supra 
note 44, p.186. 
46 Alan Nicol (2003), The Nile; Moving Beyond Cooperation, Printed by UNESCO, Division 
of Water Science, Paris, France, 2003, p.13 Available at: 
   <http//www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp> (Accessed: 11/02/2014). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Y. Arsano (2007), Ethiopia and the Nile – Dilemmas of National and Regional Hydro 
politics, Doctoral Thesis, ETH Zurich, 2007, p. 56. 
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and more recently in the course of the ‘restructuring’ of the former Soviet bloc 
and the recent emergence of new states in the horn of Africa.49  
State succession differs from government succession, and they involve 
different processes. Any change in the nature and identity of the governing 
authority does not affect the international legal personality of a state.50 In other 
words, international law distinguishes between a “change of State personality 
and change of the government of the State.”51 When governments change, 
“[t]here is a strong presumption that the State continues to exist, with its rights 
and obligations, despite revolutionary changes in government, or despite a 
period when there is no, or no effective, government”.52 
International law has become increasingly significant in determining when 
and how to transfer legal responsibility from a predecessor state to a successor 
state. International dilemmas –including treaty obligations, debt responsibilities, 
and the allocation of assets– have been the subject-matter of significant debate 
and controversy. The International Law Commission has made significant 
progress in developing universal legal rules, yet a great deal of ambiguity 
remains. Thus the issue as to which laws or conventions are applicable to state 
succession deserves due attention. 
There are three conventions which are directly related to succession of states 
under international law. These are the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of 
treaties, the 1978 Vienna Convention on the succession of States in respect of 
Treaties, and the 1983 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect 
of State Property, Archives and Debts. These three conventions can be used in 
resolving disputes relating to state succession between two or more states. 53 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties deals with how states 
enter into agreements.54 It lays the general procedures to be followed during 
formation and termination and further stipulates the effects of the treaties. It is a 
codification of customary international rules.55 The 1978 Vienna Convention 
deals with the succession of states in respect of treaties and is the most specific 
                                           
49 Matthew Craven (2002), The International Law of State Succession, International Law 
Forum du droit international 2: 2002-2005 @ 2000 Kluwer Law International, 
Netherlands, p. 202.  
50 James Crawford (2007), The Creation of States in International Law , 2d ed., p.34 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53  Beato, Andrew M. (1994) “Newly Independent and Separating States Succession to 
Treaties; Considerations on the Hybrid Dependency of the Republic of the Former Soviet 
Union”, American University Law Review 9, no.2 (1994): 527.  
54  Ibid. 
55 Tim Hiller, supra note 15, p.189. 
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international law dealing with state succession.56 The 197857 Vienna Convention 
fills the gap regarding state succession and addresses the issues which the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties has failed to address.58  
The close link between this convention and the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the law of treaties has been stressed (in no less than three places) in the 
preamble of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect 
of Treaties.59 In the same preamble, it is stated that the provisions of this 
convention constitute codification and progressive development of international 
law.60 The 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties substantially influences the practice of states and guides their 
interpretation in various unresolved succession matters.61 
The 1983 Vienna Convention62 on the Succession of States in respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts includes very specific provisions.  It clearly states 
the provisions that should be used to resolve problems related to state property, 
archives and debts.63 But this convention does not form generally binding 
customary law because it has not attained the minimum number of signatory 
countries in order to bring the law in operation.64 
Thus today the convention which is applicable to solve issues related with 
state succession is the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in 
respect of Treaties.  It has already been ratified by many states and is becoming 
customary international law because many states and the International Court of 
Justice solve problems of state succession based on the Convention.65 The 
following sections thus employ this Convention. 
                                           
56 Paul Reuter (1989), Introduction to the Law of Treaties, 1989, London; Brown Pinter 
Publishers, p. 23. 
57  The 1978 Vienna Convention entered into force on 6 November 1997. The delayed entry 
into force gives rise to a number of questions including the reason why it took nearly 
twenty years for the Convention to obtain the necessary amount of ratification.  
58 Ibid. 
59  See the preamble of the 1978 Vienna Convention. 
60  Ibid. 
61 Tim Hiller, supra note 15, p.189. 
62   The Convention was adopted with 54 votes in favor (mainly socialist and developing 
states), with 11 votes against and 11 abstentions (western states). It has not entered into 
force, as it obtained only 6 accessions out of the fifteen required and six states have 
signed the conventions. See International Law association, Berlin Conference (2004), 
Aspects of the law of State Succession.  
63  Ibid. 
64  Paul Reuter, supra note 56, p.33. 
65  See case concerning the Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Projects (Hungary/Slovakia, Judgment 
of 25, September 1997 Paragraph 123, in which the court found that 1878 Vienna 
Convention to be declaratory of Customary international law.  
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4. Succession to International Transboundary Water 
Agreements 
There is much controversy (in the international legal discourse) on the concept 
of state succession.66 This is partially attributable to the uncertainty of state 
practice in relation to state succession and could be described on the grounds of 
a unique agreement and different set of rules distinct from “the category of state 
succession”.67 Not many settled legal rules have emerged.68 Moreover, state 
practice with respect to succession is not coherent and is often determined not 
by legal but political considerations on a case by case basis.69 A number of 
academic theories have been proposed, the content of which remains subject to 
doctrinal debate. Such issues include the theory of universal continuity of 
treaties versus the theory of tabula rasa.70   
In other words, it is not clear, from either writings on international law or the 
practice of states, how and to what extent a legal principle of state succession 
applies in the sense of the transmissibility of rights and obligations from one 
state to another.71 In fact, state succession does not entail an “automatic juridical 
substitution of the factual successor state in the complex sum of rights and 
obligations of the predecessor state.”72 Theoretically speaking, “where there is a 
separation or secession from an independent state which continues, in order to 
create a new state, the former continues as a state, albeit territorially reduced, 
with its international rights and obligations intact”.73  With regard to the 
seceding territory, “the leading view appears to be that the newly created state 
will commence international life free from the treaty rights and obligations 
applicable to its former sovereign”.74 This is, inter alia, because it is difficult to 
maintain (as a rule of general application) that non-signatory states to particular 
treaties are bound by them.75 
                                           
66  Mattew C. R. Craven (1998), The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States 
Under International Law, European Journal of International Law 9 (1998), p.142. 
67 Shaw, Malcolm N. (1991), International law, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK 1991, p. 253. 
68 Arthur Okoth-Owiro, supra note 24, p.27. 
69 Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, the Historical Dispute over 
the Sharing of the Nile: Breaking the Deadlock and Charting a Way Forward, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, June 3, 2010, p.7. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Paul Reuter, supra note 56, p.40. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Shaw Malcolm N., supra note 67, p. 253. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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As a matter of general rule, a treaty cannot bind a non-party, and other 
parties to a treaty are not under legal obligation to accept a new comer party, as 
it were, by default.76 The rule of non-transmissibility applies both to “secession 
of newly independent states (that is, to cases of decolonization) and to other 
appearances of new states by the union or dissolution of states”.77 To the general 
rule of non-continuity (the “clean state” doctrine) there are some exceptions.78 
The clear examples are: “law-making treaties or treaties evidencing rules of 
general international law and/or boundary treaties”.79 
As some authors like Arthur Okoth-Owiro  noted, a third category of treaties, 
which they call ‘dispositive’, ‘localized’ or ‘real’, are exceptions to the grand 
rule of non-transmissibility.80 Dispositive treaties, are “those which create ‘real’ 
rights and obligations i.e. rights and obligations in rem in territory and immune 
to the change of sovereignty and rem with the land like the easement of English 
Common law or the servitudes of Roman law”.81 Examples of such treaties 
include “river treaties, boundary treaties and treaties of peace and neutrality”.82 
Legally speaking, an international instrument governing succession into legal 
rights and obligations is the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
respect of Treaties, which was adopted on 23 August 1978 and entered into 
force in 1996.83 Article 2(1)(f) of the Convention defines successor state as the 
territory “which immediately before the date of the succession of states was a 
dependent territory for the international relations of which the predecessor state 
was responsible.” Article 16 laid down the general rule that such states were not 
bound to maintain in force or to become a party to any treaty by reason only of 
the fact that the treaty had been in force regarding the territory in question at the 
date of succession. This approach was deemed to build upon the “traditional 
‘clean slate’ principle applying to new states created out of existing states”.84 
                                           
76 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 34.  






83 Some Nile riparian States have signed (Sudan) and ratified (Egypt and Ethiopia) this 
Convention. 
84  The proponents of the tabula rasa, or clean-slate doctrine of state succession argue that 
upon state succession the predecessor states personality and its identity completely 
disappear. The entirely new international sovereignty personality appears in its stead with 
no legal connection or derivation between the predecessors and successor entities.   
      See Daniel C. Turact, International Law and the New States of Africa, by Yilma 
Mekonnen, 8 Maryland journal of International Law, 303 (1984) available at  
    <http://digitalcommons.lw.Umaryland.edu/mjii/vol8/issue 217>.  
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A sharp comparison exists between legal regimes of an international 
agreement on non-transferable rights and obligations in all cases of state 
succession except the ‘clean slate’ principle for decolonized nations as 
reaffirmed and validated by the Vienna Conventions and state practice.85 The 
1978 Vienna Convention contains some customary international law rules on 
rights and obligations relating to the territory, e.g. those establishing boundaries 
or boundary regimes are not affected and, in effect, binding on successor 
states.86 More specifically Article 11 states that “a succession of states does not 
as such affect a boundary established by a treaty and/or obligations and rights 
established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary”.87 
The literature on grounds of justifying claims of the invalidity of the treaties 
or their termination has been mixed as far as state succession and the colonial 
1929 and 1959 Nile water treaties are concerned. Whether, colonial water 
agreements bind all the basin states is a question of considerable controversy. 
To use comments from one of the external assessors of this article, “All states 
that have taken part in the conclusion of the 1929 and 1959 Agreements have 
taken parallel positions regarding the binding nature of the agreements by 
reference to international law.”    
On the one hand, State practice and intention of contracting parties to the 
1929 and 1959 Nile water Agreements are inconsistent with claims of their 
validity or continued application of the agreements.  For instance, Great Britain 
had adopted the attitude that “the 1929 and 1959 Nile water Agreements should 
be renegotiated, and (in 1959) the British government had issued a statement to 
this effect”.88 Almost all of the Nile basin states have adopted a doctrine on state 
succession to treaties they had concluded with Britain and have refused to be 
bound by them. This policy is known as “the Nyerere Doctrine on state 
succession” which views colonial-era treaties to be non-binding if such decision 
is in line with state interests. 89  
Available evidence also shows that states in the Nile basin are taking 
unilateral decisions (or sub-basin approaches) in the utilization and development 
of the Nile water. Tanzania, for example, “began to build a pipeline in 2004 to 
supply drinking water to approximately 1 million inhabitants of its parched 
                                           
85 Wasihun Aserre, State Succession and International Loan Agreements with reference to 
Eritrea, Senior Essay, Unpublished, Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Law, 1996, p.62. 
86 See Vienna Convention on State Succession Art. 11. 
87 Ibid.  
88 See Guarreston, “The Nile River System”,  Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, 1960:143.   
89 See Makonnen, Y., 1984. The Nyerere Doctrine of state succession and the new state of 
East Africa. Arusha: East Africa Publications. 
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communities in Kahama and Shinyanga.”90 Kenya's and other riparian 
neighbours’ need of water for various developmental-related works coupled 
with the strong desire of termination of colonial agreements have created a 
conducive environment to use the Nile water in the Great Lakes region.91 And, 
upstream nations namely, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya have 
signed the Cooperative Framework Agreement, that is meant to replace the 1929 
and 1959 Nile Water Agreements. 92 Thus, state practice seems to go contrary to 
the claim of validity or continued application of the treaties. To use a comment 
from one of the external assessors of this article, “concerning intention, as 
gathered from the treaties themselves, the attitude of the British government and 
Egypt does not evidence intention for the treaties being binding in perpetuity.” 
Moreover, the majority of writers on the subject-matter have arrived at the 
conclusion that these treaties are not binding, with the “only controversial cases 
appearing to be the case of the 1929 and the Owens Falls Agreement.” 93  
On the other hand, some Egyptian writers are of the opinion that the Nile 
water treaties are valid and binding on the successor states.94 They argue that 
Egypt maintains ‘natural and historical rights’ that are “vested rights resting 
upon a solid legal, basis furnished by the principle of prior appropriation as 
acknowledged in international law and applied by courts in international and 
quasi-international disputes”.95 According to Egypt, the 1929 agreement has also 
devolved to former British colonies in East Africa including Sudan and is 
subject to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which the International Court of Justice considers as codifying pre-existing 
international customary law.’96 Egypt argues that the convention allows 
termination and suspension of the existing treaties only under the treaty 
                                           
90 Aaron Tesfaye (2012) “Environmental security, regime building and international law in 
the Nile Basin”, Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études 
africaines, 46:2, 271-287, p.272. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Id., p. 280. 
93 See  Emmanuel B. Kasimbazi (2010) The impact of colonial agreements on the regulation 
of the waters of the River Nile, Water International, 35:6, 718-732,  P.723 DOI: 
10.1080/02508060.2010.533642 and Exchange of notes constituting an agreement 
between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the government of Egypt regarding the construction of the Owen Falls Dam in 
Uganda. Cairo, 16 July 1952 and 5 January 1953. Available from:  
     <http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/owen-fallsdam3.html: 
[Accessed 15 August  2010]. This agreement was entered into between Egypt and the 
British administration on behalf of the Uganda protectorate with regard to the construction 
of the Owen Falls Dam. 
94 Fahmy, A. M., “The Legal Regime of the River, 1986”. 
95 Emmanuel, supra note 93, p. 726.  
96 Ibid. 
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provisions by consent of the parties or by a fundamental change of circumstances 
that are preconditions (which according to Egypt) have not yet occurred.97 
The contribution of the International Court of Justice’s jurisprudence to the 
consolidation and clarification of the legal regime of state succession has been 
very minimal.98 This is principally attributed to two major reasons. First, while 
state succession has been a subject-matter of investigation by the ICJ since 
1945, the number of ICJ cases pertaining to it has been relatively insignificant. 
Second, and more importantly, when issues of succession arise, the Court with 
“the exception of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case has avoided addressing them in a 
principled way” and it has rather opted  “to decide the underlying issues on a 
case-by-case basis, be it for reasons of judicial expediency or due to a lack of 
consensus among the members of the bench”.99 The only ICJ decision that has 
direct relevance to the subject matter at hand is the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case.  
Notwithstanding many disagreements pertaining to treaty succession, it has 
been agreed that treaty regimes that regulate the use of territory (for example by 
placing certain restrictions on its use) ‘run with the land’ and thus are not 
affected by state succession. Against this background, the ICJ, in its 1997 
Judgment in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, confirmed the view already taken by the 
ILC when it drafted the provision.100 Moreover, and again in line with the 
International Law Commission’s position, the ICJ found that “treaties 
concerning water rights or navigation on rivers are commonly regarded as 
candidates for inclusion in the category of territorial treaties.”101  
The transmissibility of boundary-related treaties to a successor state is 
justified in “functionalist terms: ‘prudence’ and the desire to avoid the ‘chaos 
that would ensue’ should boundary treaties be open to renegotiation”.102 The 
aforementioned justification is in favour of maintaining rights and liabilities 
related to boundary-related treaties of pre and post succession.103 The continuity 
of boundary treaties is less controversial, but there is debate about the 
                                           
97 Ibid. 
98 Andreas Zimmermann (2013).  The International Court of Justice and State Succession to 
Treaties: Avoiding Principled Answers to Questions of Principles, Oxford University 
Press, p. 54.   
99 Ibid. 
100 Id., p. 63. 
101 In the Commentary on its Draft Articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, the 
ILC had identified ‘treaties of a territorial character’ as being unaffected by succession of 
states.  
102 Fasil Amdesion (2009), “Scrutinizing the Scorpion Problematique: Arguments in Favor of 
the Continued Relevance of International Law and a Multidisciplinary Approach to 
Resolving the Nile Dispute”, Texas International Journal, Vol. 44:1, Texas, USA, 2009, 
p. 29. 
103 Ibid. 
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transmissibility of boundary-related treaties to the new successor state.104 More 
specifically, there is the need to examine whether treaties governing trans-
boundary water resources fall within the boundary exception “instead of the 
more expansive category of treaties that are nullified at independence”. 105 
It has been argued that international agreements pertaining to the use of 
international rivers could fall in the category of exceptional treaties instantly 
binding successor states as they are considered by some as annexed to the 
territory.106 However, newly independent African States such as Tanzania have 
often refused to be bound by water agreements concluded by predecessor 
States.107 A clear demarcation should be drawn “between rights and obligations 
concerning international rivers that are of territorial character and those rights 
and obligations that concern the waters flowing in a river in their characteristics 
as a natural resource”.108 Established navigation rights are equated with the right 
to pass through a state’s territory taking “advantage of the specific surface 
texture of water;” they are naturally linked to the territory of a State and thus are 
not altered by succession.109 The presumed transmissibility of rights and 
obligations that relate to water use as a natural resource, such as “water supply 
to non-riparian population would constitute an ex ante restriction of sovereignty 
of the new state with respect to its right to dispose of natural resources on its 
territory”. 110 
A supporting argument is found in the works of the International Law 
Commission, which drafted the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in respect of Treaties, and had declared its support for the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The Commission had voted in 
favour of article 13 for it was convinced that States must have full sovereignty 
over their natural resources.111 Article 13 had the merit of treating the principle 
                                           
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid . 
106  An ideal example might be drawn from the recent Gabcicovo-Nagymaros case in which 
a central point of dispute was whether the agreement to construct a series of dam along 
the Danube was essentially in the nature of a treaty establishing a territorial regime and 
therefore subject to automatic succession. The response of the court to the question was in 
the affirmative, see case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project ( Hungary-
Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997.     
107 Arthur Okoth-Owiro , supra note  24 , p.30. 
108 Jacob Granit, supra note 29, p. 40. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Green Cross International, National Sovereignty and International Watercourses, Green 
Cross International printing press, Hague, Switzerland, March 2000, p.8. 
111 United Nations, Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties15th Plenary 
Meeting, Extract from volume II of the Official Records of the United Nations 
Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (Summary records of the 
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of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as an element of international 
law. The Convention confirms and validates “the natural principle of 
international law of the sovereignty of every people and every State over its 
natural wealth and resources”.112  It is very important to understand the structure 
and content of articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the 1978 Convention and must be 
viewed as part of an entire package.   
The International Law Commission felt that the transmittable rights and 
obligations of reciprocal international agreements concerning the new successor 
nation was not, in principle, a manifestation and affirmation of international 
customary law. The exception can the will of the concerned states and the grand 
rule with respect of reciprocal international agreements so that the post-
independence transfer of rights and obligations becomes an issue for the parties 
to settle through a mutual agreement, expressly or impliedly, between the newly 
emerged nation and the other contracting members which had agreed with the 
predecessor state.113 The International Law Commission notes that a reciprocal 
bilateral international agreement applicable for the area in question is deemed to 
be applicable for the successor state and for the remaining other state party 
where there is an expressed mutual agreement or if it can be inferred from the 
conduct of the concerned states as if they have so agreed.114 
5.  Succession of South Sudan to the 1929 and 1959 Nile 
Water Agreements 
Some authors like Mohammed argue that South Sudan's status determination in 
light of rules of international law pertaining to state succession is vital for the 
determination of applicable treaty rules. They contend that South Sudan should 
not be deemed as a newly independent state for the purpose of the 1978 Vienna 
Convention.115 Some also argue that the independence of South Sudan is an act 
of devolution, which is bilateral and consensual, and a different set of rules shall 
be applicable. However, it is irrelevant for the purpose of state succession 
whether South Sudan is a newly independent state or a separating state for the 
purpose of the discussion at hand. 116 
                                                                                                            
plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole), Vienna, Austria, 
31 July-23 August 1978,  
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112  See  Article 13 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. 
113 Id., See  Article 24.   
114 Ibid. 
115 Mohammed Helal, supra note 11, p. 947.  
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It is true that International law recognizes a special category of treaties that 
establish territorial obligations. It is also true that strong weight of state acts and 
judicial opinion assessments confirm that these territorial obligations remain 
unaltered by state succession. The 1959 Nile water Agreement regulates the use 
of trans-boundary waters by two riparian states. This involves “regulating the 
exploitation of resources flowing through the territories of these two states”. 117 
However, the above assertion fails to distinguish between obligations that are 
purely territorial in nature and obligations which seem territorial in nature that 
are inherently related with the sovereignty of states to utilize their natural 
resources. When the transmissibility of the 1929 and 1959 Nile Agreements to 
the new state of South Sudan is examined in light of the 1978 Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, South Sudan has an 
internationally recognized right to dispose of natural resources on its territory 
based on the principle of clean slate doctrine or tabula rasa. The 1929 and 1959 
Nile Agreements are about the use of water as a natural resource, and the 1978 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties under Article 
13 has declared its support for the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources which is equally applicable to the new state of South Sudan. 
As Fasil notes, “the 1929 and 1959 agreements do not deal with the contours of 
boundaries in any shape or form but with the concrete issue of allocating the 
waters of the Nile between riparian states”.118 The 1929 and 1959 agreements 
governing trans-boundary water resources do not thus fall within the boundary 
exceptional clause.119   
It is also argued that the 1959 Nile water agreement is territorial in nature as 
the International Court of Justice recognized article 12 of the 1978 Vienna 
Convention as a rule of International Customary law in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros case stating that “treaties concerning water rights or navigation on 
rivers are commonly regarded as candidates for inclusion in the category of 
territorial treaties” (citation 86 Para. 123).120  The 1959 Agreement is similar 
with the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case in one major component: its purpose was 
to regulate the construction of water dam projects on specific parts of the Nile 
within the territory of Sudan and Egypt121 which are similar in nature to the 
                                           
117 Id., p. 964. 
118 Fasil Amdesion, supra note 102, p. 35. 
119  Possible Egypt and Sudan recourse to the boundary exception or other negations of the 
tabula rasa doctrine are likely to be imperfect rebuttals at best, for Cairo and Khartoum 
have previously denounced treaties signed by the Great Britain on their behalf, “ Id they 
no longer reflect their development needs.” See Christina Carroll, “Past and Future Legal 
Framework of the Nile River Baisn”, GEO. INT’L  ENVTL. REV, 269, 279, (1999).   
120 Nadia Sanchez  and Yoyeeta Gupta , supra note 12, p. 374.    
121 See 1959 Nile Water Agreements, Arts 2-3. 
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system of locks on the Danube.122 However, the 1929 and 1959 agreements fix 
allocations and they rely “on the theory of limited territorial sovereignty as its 
legal doctrinal framework”.123 Under the 1959 Nile Agreement, the two 
countries came up with volumetric water allocation-55 Bm3/yr to Egypt and 
18.5 Bm 3/yr to Sudan. It can be concluded that the agreement was primarily 
designed with the simple allocation and full control of the Nile water which 
cannot be regarded as a territorial treaty.  
Moreover, the 1929 and 1959 agreements lack a state succession provision, 
and international law governing state succession in respect to treaties is limited 
to customary international law, which holds that the successor state must accept 
treaty obligations for them to remain binding.124 Therefore, the 1929 and 1959 
Nile water agreements come under extensive list of treaties that can be nullified 
at any time.125 To put it differently, the new state of South Sudan can nullify the 
agreements if it wishes to do so according to Article 24 of 1978 Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties.  
The Vienna Convention on Treaties (which entered into force in 1980) lacks 
any provision pertaining to the succession of states in respect to treaties.126 
Rather, the Convention on Treaties considers South Sudan a third state, non-
party, in relation to the 1959 Nile Water Agreement127 and a third state must 
assent in writing to an international agreement in order to be bound by rights 
and obligations emanating from the treaty.128 The 1959 Nile Water Agreement 
does not bind South Sudan under the convention on treaties because South 
Sudan has never consented in writing. 129 Though, Sudan ratified the Convention 
and Egypt acceded to it,130  as Charles pointed out, “a potential conflict between 
the Convention on Treaties and the Convention on State Succession on this 
matter is averted by Article 4 of the Convention on Treaties” which limits “the 
scope of the convention to treaties enacted after the Convention came into force 
in 1980.’131 The Convention on Treaties, because of the non-retroactivity clause 
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pter 23&Tempmtdsg3&langen>.   
131 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 4. 
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(Article 4), therefore, does not apply to South Sudan and the 1959 Nile Water 
Agreement.  
While Egypt has signed and ratified the Convention on State Succession, 
Sudan has yet to endorse the agreement through ratification process, implying 
that this Convention currently lacks the power to bind both parties.132 Sudan was 
never a member party to the Convention on State Succession, and the 1959 Nile 
Water Agreement under the Convention on State Succession does not bind 
South Sudan. This author’s argument is supported by the 1978 Vienna 
Convention. Article 35 of the Convention provides: 
When, after separation of any part of the territory of a State, the Predecessor 
State continues to exist, any treaty which at the date of the succession of 
States was in force in respect of the Predecessor State continues in force in 
respect of its remaining territory unless: 
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; 
(b) it is established that the treaty related only to the territory which has 
separated from the predecessor State; or 
(c) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the application 
of the treaty in respect of the Predecessor State would be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the 
conditions for its operation.  
This provision of the Convention states that as a general rule, if a state continues 
to exist after separation of part of its territory, any treaty which at the date of the 
succession was in force in respect of the predecessor state continues to be in 
force in respect of its remaining territory. This means that the predecessor state 
territory will be bound by the treaty unless the exceptions enumerated under the 
same article apply. The first exception to the general rule applies when the 
concerned states agree otherwise.133  
The second exception is when a treaty in force at the date of succession was 
made for the sole benefit of one of those territories which are now successor 
states and related only to the territory separated.  Had this exception been 
applicable, Sudan could have declared that the 1929 and 1959 Nile agreements 
are no longer binding as the direct consequence of South Sudan succession and 
fundamental changes in the circumstances of the state concerned.   
Article 62(2) provides an exception where fundamental change of 
circumstance may not be invoked as a ground for termination or withdrawing 
from a treaty. One major exception is if a treaty establishes a boundary whereby 
treaty cannot be terminated even if the grounds for the existence of fundamental 
                                           
132 Ibid.  
133  At the time of writing this Article, Sudan and Egypt have succeeded into the right of the 
1929 and 1959 Agreements, See <http://www.dailynewsegpt.com/2014/00/21>.     
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change of circumstances are present. The second exception is if the fundamental 
change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either with regard to an 
obligation under the treaty or any other international obligation owed to any 
other party to the treaty. Examining the facts against the above exceptions, the 
1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements are not treaties that establish boundary 
and are meant to ensure full hegemonic control over the Nile water resources.  
The principle of rebus sic stantibus (change of circumstances) cannot thus be 
waived with regard to the 1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements. The birth of 
South Sudan constitutes fundamental change of circumstance which is an event 
that can enable Sudan if it opts to set aside its obligations under the 1959 Nile 
water agreements. Thus, there is no room for the application of the exceptions 
and the option of termination of the Nile treaties remains open, not only to 
South Sudan, but to Sudan as well.    
As a comment from one of the external assessors indicates, some writers 
contend that rebus sic stantibus causes immediate termination of a treaty in 
question, while others claim that it merely provides a state an option to 
terminate it. Article 45 of the Vienna Convention seems to adhere to the second 
approach, and it provides that a ground for invalidity, termination, withdrawal or 
suspension “may no longer be invoked by the state where, after becoming aware 
of the facts, it expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or by 
reason of its conduct may be deemed to have acquiesced in the validity of the 
treaty or its continuance in force.”  In light of article 45 of the VCLT, Sudan has 
not (after the birth of South Sudan) taken a concrete measure to terminate the 
1959 Nile water Agreement obviously for pragmatic purposes. Sudan has thus 
so far upheld the 1959 Nile Water Agreement thereby confirming similar 
positions with Egypt.134  
6. Legal Implications of South Sudan’s Separation on the 
1929 and 1959 Nile Water Agreements 
The South Sudan referendum conducted in January 2011 decided 
overwhelmingly for separation from Sudan.135  South Sudan will have to decide 
on how to proceed on succession with respect to the international Nile water 
agreements currently applicable in the territory; e.g. (a) apply universal 
continuity by unilateral declaration of succession, or (b) review Nile water treaty 
                                           
134 Egypt Nile Quota Too Low, Al Ahram Weekly, Jan 15, 2013, Sudan’s Bashir Visits 
Egypt, Confirms ’ Identical Positions on the Nile Water Disputes;  Sudan Tribune, Sept. 
17, 2015. 
135 See, South Sudan’s Flag Raised at Independence Ceremony, BBC News (July, 2011), 
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and declare subsequently whether to be bound or not.136 And, a possible third 
option is a pledge of neutrality on the utilization of the Nile Water 
Agreements.137  
The 1929 and 1959 Nile bilateral agreements do not include any provision 
regarding State succession,138 and thus a unilateral declaration of succession by 
South Sudan need to be accepted by other contracting Parties. Response to a 
unilateral declaration of universal continuity of international Nile water treaties 
by South Sudan can apparently be welcomed by Sudan and Egypt and South 
Sudan’s accession to these treaties can be effected by notification to the 
depository because accession is generally not contended by other contracting 
Parties.   
The second option is review of the treaty. The objective of multilateral 
treaties is to unite as many States as possible.  To this end, South Sudan, Sudan 
and Egypt on the occasion of the emergence of the new state of South Sudan can 
see an opportunity to renegotiate the 1929 and 1959 Nile bilateral agreement on 
a case-by-case basis. A possible third option is a pledge of neutrality on the 
utilization of the Nile Water Agreements.  
The course of action pursued by South Sudan has impact on its relationship 
with the upper and lower riparians of the Nile. The state of volatility in the 
sharing of water resources can be thus adversely affect or facilitate Sudan’s 
future development ambitions, depending on how the country will pursue its 
water policies in the volatile political environment.139   
7. South Sudan’s Prospective Position on the Nile 
Agreements and its Implication to Ethiopia 
Legal separation of South Sudan and its possible future position on the Nile 
issue can either strengthen the one sided colonial treaty signed between Egypt 
and  Sudan or can create a new era of unifying the entire basin members into a 
new inclusive legal regime governing the utilization and management of the 
Nile River. South Sudan’s acceptance or rejection of the 1929 and 1959 Nile 
                                           
136 As of writing of this article, the Government of South Sudan has not announced its 
intention to undertake major water works. Also, it is unclear what the position of 
Government of South Sudan is regarding the existing legal framework of the Nile river.  
137 Roozenbeek, J., (2014): A New Stalemate: The Influence of South Sudan’s Independence 
on the Nile Basin’s Water Politics. Master thesis in Sustainable Development at Uppsala 
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139  Samson S. Wassara (2003), South Sudan in Volatility of Sharing the Nile Basin 
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water agreements could have positive or negative consequences on Ethiopia’s 
long awaited quest for fair and reasonable utilization of the Nile River since the 
Nile River is a common and shared natural resource that connects the people of 
all basin members. There are three options for South Sudan on the issue of the 
1929 and 1959 Nile Agreements. The first option is succession to the 1929 and 
1959 Agreements, the second is refusing succession to the Agreements and third 
is remaining neutral.  
Under the first scenario, one of the issues to be analyzed is what would be 
the future potential implication to Ethiopia and other riparian states? If South 
Sudan decides to succeed into rights and obligations of this agreement, this 
would be a clear signal of alignment with the downstream riparian states.140 
Ethiopia as one of the upstream riparian states will have to deal with a three-
front negotiation which could be a political obstacle to nullify and reduce the 
binding nature of the 1929 and 1959 Nile Agreements as the Nile remains 
without an all-inclusive legal regime to regulate its use.141   
If the Sudan and Egypt agree to this succession, water allocations under the 
agreement would need to be renegotiated. It is unlikely that Egypt would accept 
a reduction of its allocated share142 in a renegotiation which involves Sudan, 
South Sudan and Egypt. Sudan and South Sudan would have also to negotiate 
regarding the current allocation to Egypt.143 Moreover, the fifth article of the 
1959 Nile Agreement, which requires a unified position in negotiations 
concerning Nile waters with any other riparian State, would apply to South 
Sudan under this scenario. In other words, South Sudan must have a unified 
stand with Sudan and Egypt against Ethiopia and other upper riparian states. 
The requirement of a unified negotiation position would thus curtail South 
Sudan’s freedom in engaging in various projects with its upstream neighbours. 
Furthermore, the 1959 Agreement provides for the construction of water 
conservation schemes in South Sudan.144 This is an implicit reference to the 
Jonglei canal project, a project which is not very popular in the South.145 The 
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Sudanese government would have been able to restart construction activities on 
the canal during the interim period, but the Southern Sudanese government has 
stated ‘it’s environmental, social and economic concerns with the project, and 
[has] expressed its unwillingness to cooperate on expanding the canal.’146  
Under the second scenario of refusing the succession to international Nile 
water treaties, South Sudan could follow the Nyerere Doctrine, i.e., reviewing 
earlier treaties regarding their binding effect.147 With respect to the 1929 Nile 
Water Agreement, it could claim further that it was concluded under colonial 
rule.148 In not accepting the binding force of the 1959 agreement, South Sudan 
would signal alignment with the upstream neighbours.149 Ethiopia as upstream 
riparian state will have to deal with a two front negotiation which could easily 
reduce the binding nature of the 1959 Nile Agreement and pressure Egypt and 
Sudan to renegotiate the 1959 Nile Agreement. And, South Sudan will be a 
potential ally for influencing the downstream countries in future water sharing 
arrangements.  
South Sudan might further decide to sign and ratify the Cooperative 
Framework Agreement (CFA), a step that can most likely antagonize Sudan and 
Egypt if these countries continue to remain outside the Framework. Article 42 of 
the CFA states that it shall enter into force “on the sixtieth day following the 
date of the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession with the 
African Union”.150 In order to change this requirement, the treaty text needs to 
be reopened for negotiation, which is unlikely. The treaty does not limit 
signature to the ten States listed. Article 40 states that it is “open to signature by 
all States in whose territory part of the Nile River Basin is situated”.151 
The CFA can provide South Sudan with greater flexibility for its current and 
future water needs, stronger ties with socio-cultural regional peers, and greater 
domestic sovereignty.152 The cost of the CFA would be lack of a ‘guaranteed 
allotment’153 to the dissatisfaction of Egypt which in return (to befriend riparian 
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states), can provide South Sudan with much needed resource to its most pressing 
economic and social services. A policy of equitable and reasonable utilization 
represents an ideal short-term solution for South Sudan in that it attempts to 
minimize any negative trade-offs while maximizing the positive benefits.154  
The third scenario would mean a pledge of neutrality on the use of the Nile 
waters. This scenario can involve a unilateral decision-making process in the 
utilization and management of the Nile water without being part of 
any alternative legal regime advocated by Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and 
CFA signatories on the other hand.  This option pleases the lower riparian states, 
i.e., Egypt and Sudan that have a strategic and vested interest in befriending 
South Sudan so as to be able to influence its foreign and regional policy.  
Notwithstanding the above scenarios, it is also important to consider the 
interest of South Sudan in light of the upper and lower riparian state discussions. 
As South Sudan lies almost entirely in the White Nile catchment area, and has 
no hydrological or geographical dependence on the Blue Nile, it is equally a 
lower and an upper riparian state depending on the flow of the Nile River. It is a 
lower riparian state as compared to Ethiopia and an upper riparian state as 
compared to Sudan and Egypt. It will be hydrologically impossible to coordinate 
development projects without the consent of Ethiopia, if South Sudan prefers to 
join the old colonial water treaties. The 1959 water agreement reinforces 
“inequality by denying the upper riparian states rights to development 
programs”, and South Sudan as an upper riparian state to Sudan and Egypt 
cannot be an exception. As a free state and an upper riparian state, South Sudan 
needs to play its diplomatic cards well without being handicapped by the 
provision of the 1959 Nile Water Agreement. 155  
After all, projects that could benefit South Sudan, such as hydropower were 
not articulated in the 1959 water agreement. As it can be clearly understood 
from the text of the agreements, a reference is made to the water development of 
‘Jongeli Canal Project’ with the sole intention of benefiting the then Sudan and 
Egypt.156 In accordance with the 1959 Nile water agreements, the additional 
water yield of the project would be split between Egypt and Sudan upon 
completion. Moreover, the fact that the agreement was not concluded for the 
sole benefit of South Sudan can be clear when one examines the wording of the 
Nile development initiatives to increase water yields of the Nile.157 The 1959 
Agreement thus empowers Egypt to begin construction projects within Sudan in 
order to increase the yields of the Nile.158 
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It is thus in the best interest of South Sudan to join the Cooperative 
Framework Agreement (CFA), which is considered as a replacement of the 1959 
Nile Agreement and advantageous to possible future development pursuits along 
the Nile. The government of South Sudan has already made “a declaration of 
intention to sign the agreement during the June 2013 annual Nile-Com 
Conference in Juba in 2013”.159 South Sudan is already full member of the NBI 
and is expected to be signatory of the CFA, as a result of which the 1959 
Agreement is increasingly becoming irrelevant in South Sudan. 
Conclusion 
Had there been an all-inclusive and agreeable legal regime governing the Nile 
Basin, South Sudan’s succession of the colonial 1929 and 1959 Nile Water 
Agreements would have been irrelevant. However, that is not the case. The Nile 
remains governed by a fragmented legal regime. Some of the treaties comprising 
this regime are inherited from the colonial era and South Sudan has to deal with 
the subject matter as a new independent state within the context of state 
succession.  
The major argument in this article is that the birth of South Sudan has created 
the question of state succession and that the 1929 and 1959 Nile agreements 
concluded between Sudan and Egypt do not bind the new state.  I argue that the 
1929 and 1959 agreements governing trans-boundary water resources of the 
Nile do not fall within the boundary of exceptional clause thereby enabling the 
new state of South Sudan to nullify the agreements at any time.   
However, the aforementioned conclusion depends on the possible political 
choice of South Sudan, which could lead into three scenarios with different 
implication to Ethiopia and other riparian states of the Nile basin. The first 
scenario is acceding to the Nile water agreements to the satisfaction of Egypt 
and to the disappointment other Nile basin countries that have invalidated the 
agreements. The second scenario is rejection of the colonial Nile water treaties 
and having clear signal of alignment with the upstream riparian states including 
Ethiopia. A possible third scenario is a pledge of neutrality on the utilization of 
the Nile. 
South Sudan’s preferred choice among the three scenarios will demonstrate 
the political and economic aspects of international watercourse rights. Since the 
availability of water is vital for economic development of country, South 
Sudan’s recourse to a particular scenario among the options is expected to be 
guided by the nation’s economic and political goals as each scenario presents 
with its own blessings and curses.                                                                        ■ 
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